

1 **RESPECT THE UNSTABLE: DELAYS AND SATURATION IN**
2 **CONTACT TRACING FOR DISEASE CONTROL ***

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5 **Abstract.** Motivated by the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, this paper aims
6 to apply Gunter Stein’s cautionary message of *respecting the unstable* to the problem of controlling
7 the spread of an infectious disease. With this goal, we study the effect that delays and capacity
8 constraints have in the **test, trace and isolate (TeTrIs)** process, and how they impact its ability to
9 prevent exponential disease spread. Our analysis highlights the critical importance of speed and scale
10 in the **TeTrIs** process. Precisely, ensuring that the delay in the **TeTrIs** process is much smaller than
11 the doubling time of the disease spread is necessary for achieving acceptable performance. Similarly,
12 limited **TeTrIs** capacity introduces a threshold on the size of an outbreak beyond which the disease
13 spreads almost like the uncontrolled case. Along the way, we provide numerical illustrations to
14 highlight these points.

15 **Key words.** feedback control, stabilization, epidemic spread, COVID-19

16 **AMS subject classifications.** 93D15, 93D09, 93D20, 92D25, 92D30

17 **1. Introduction.** The opening lines of Gunter Stein’s classic paper *Respect the*
18 *Unstable* [24], published 13 years after his inaugural Bode Lecture of the same name,
19 read:

20 “The practical, physical (and sometimes dangerous) consequences of
21 control must be respected, and the underlying principles must be
22 clearly and well taught.”

23 The message to the control engineer and researcher is clear. Not only must the many
24 benefits of feedback be understood (pedagogically, mathematically, and in practice),
25 but also its limitations. The principle of feedback is after all inherently about trade-
26 offs, constrained by conservation laws just as fundamental as any law of physics.
27 Whilst these ‘laws of feedback’ apply to the control of all systems, Gunter Stein gave
28 special attention to unstable systems for three main reasons:

- 29 1. Unstable systems are fundamentally, and quantifiably, more difficult to con-
30 control than stable ones.
- 31 2. Controllers for unstable systems are operationally critical.
- 32 3. Closed-loop systems with unstable components are only locally stable.

33 In this paper we aim to revisit these points from the perspective of designing contact
34 tracing policies to mitigate the spread of disease throughout a population.

35 **1.1. Control of Disease Spread.** The control of disease spread is not the
36 traditional hunting ground of the control engineers, so a degree of caution from our
37 community is perhaps of even greater relevance than normal. That said, controlling
38 the spread of a disease has many of the elements of the most challenging control

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39 problems. Accurate models of the spread of a highly infectious disease are at best
 40 controversial, but certainly unstable (at least in a population with high susceptibility
 41 to the disease). The mechanisms for identifying infectious members of the population
 42 may be subject to significant delays and inaccuracies, compromising the quality of the
 43 available information for performing feedback. And finally, the options for mitigating
 44 the spread can be blunt, unpredictable, and subject to severe capacity constraints.

45 Since emerging in late 2019, the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic
 46 has made abundantly clear the effect that these challenges have on mitigating disease
 47 spread. At the time of writing (Oct. 2020), COVID-19 had reached a significant
 48 global spread (45 M documented cases) [7] and vaccines were not yet available; this
 49 meant that the primary public health tools available to limit the spread were non-
 50 pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs), such as social distancing and contact tracing
 51 [11]. Many NPIs can be understood in terms of feedback control, and as such abide
 52 by the fundamental ‘laws of feedback’ that Gunter Stein referred to. This work
 53 illustrates the impact of these limitations, placing a particular emphasis on the role
 54 of delays and saturation. We focus on contact tracing as it exhibits several of the
 55 features described above.

56 **1.2. Contact Tracing.** Contact tracing is the process of testing, tracing and
 57 isolating people known to have been in close proximity with infected individuals. All
 58 three of these steps are essential, so for this reason contact tracing is also referred
 59 to by the acronym **TeTrIs**. This intervention can disrupt chains of infection to slow
 60 and potentially end the spread of an infectious disease. It has been employed in the
 61 control of sexually transmitted infections [6, 12, 19], in limiting the severe acute respi-
 62 ratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic [5] and at an unprecedented scale in the COVID-19
 63 pandemic [23, 1].

64 The execution of **TeTrIs** varies significantly from region to region, and is rapidly
 65 evolving. Regardless of the specifics, two key characteristics contribute to the success
 66 of **TeTrIs**. The first is the delay between the moment an individual becomes infected
 67 and the moment that individual becomes isolated from the rest of the population. A
 68 larger delay allows the infected individual to infect more people. The second is the
 69 capacity of the **TeTrIs** program. We think of this capacity as the number of active
 70 cases the **TeTrIs** program can process at once without the delay growing significantly.
 71 These characteristics are determined by the structure of the **TeTrIs** program. But
 72 more practically, achieving sufficient performance in these characteristics must be
 73 used to determine the structure of the **TeTrIs** program. Thus, in this paper we seek
 74 to characterize sufficient delays and capacity of a **TeTrIs** program to successfully
 75 control the spread of an infectious disease.

76 The effects of these characteristics have been studied in the past. Many works
 77 analyze the impacts of contact tracing using computer simulations [18, 10]. Math-
 78 ematical analysis of **TeTrIs** has typically relied on two methodologies. In the first,
 79 an ordinary differential equation (ODE) models spread over a certain fixed contact
 80 graph [9, 14]. In the second, the impact of **TeTrIs** is modeled as a branching process
 81 [21, 20].

82 **1.3. Contributions of this Work.** In this work, we take a control theoretic
 83 perspective on the impacts of delays and saturation. These two phenomenon have
 84 been widely studied in the control systems field. We provide two rules of thumb for
 85 the requisite speed and capacity of a **TeTrIs** system. First by analyzing the system
 86 sensitivity function, we show that delays of even just one quarter of the doubling
 87 time of the disease may suffice to overwhelm a **TeTrIs** system. For infectious diseases

88 like COVID-19, the optimistic allowable delay to control their initial outbreak is
 89 approximately 1 day. Another implication of the analysis points to the importance of
 90 effective isolation. If we fail to isolate two thirds of the cases, such a system may not
 91 even be stabilising without delay. Second, we model the contact tracing process and
 92 show that the saturation of its limited capacity may disable an otherwise efficacious
 93 **TeTrIs** system. With saturation, we identify a threshold behavior of disease spread
 94 that implies stability regions beyond capacity and potentially significant degradation
 95 of performance.

96 The paper is structured as follows. First, we discuss the effects of delay on the
 97 efficacy contact tracing. We introduce contact tracing as a feedback loop on the classic
 98 SIR model. We derive an upper bound on delay to prevent exponential disease spread
 99 in this setting. Then, we generalize this analysis from the SIR model to general LTI
 100 and nonlinear system models with an exponentially unstable mode. This demonstrates
 101 that these limitations are fundamental, rather than an artifact of particular modelling
 102 choices. Second, we discuss the effects of saturation on the efficacy of contact tracing.
 103 We introduce two compartmental models that respectively capture the contact tracing
 104 efforts devoted to infected and uninfected populations and introduce the saturation
 105 effects of tracing capacity. Reduced stability regions are observed based on a nonlinear
 106 threshold analysis.

107 **Notation.** Transfer functions of **linear-time-invariant (LTI)** systems will be de-
 108 noted with bold face letters. For example $\mathbf{G}(s) = 1/(s + 1)$ is the transfer function
 109 from u to x for the system $\frac{dx}{dt} = -x + u$, and $\mathbf{G}(s) = \exp(-sT)$ the transfer function
 110 for the delay $x(t) = u(t - T)$. The set of all proper real rational transfer functions,
 111 i.e. functions of the form

$$112 \quad \mathbf{G}(s) = \frac{a_0 s^n + a_1 s^{n-1} + \dots + a_n}{s^n + b_1 s^{n-1} + \dots + b_n}, a_i \in \mathbb{R}, b_k \in \mathbb{R}$$

113 will be denoted by \mathcal{R} . The H-infinity norm of a transfer function \mathbf{G} is defined as

$$114 \quad \|\mathbf{G}\|_\infty := \sup \{ |\mathbf{G}(s)| : s \in \mathbb{C}, \text{Re}(s) > 0 \}.$$

115 The H-infinity norm is a central notion in the robust performance of control systems,
 116 see for example [8, §2] for an introduction.

117 **2. Contact tracing: The Need for Speed.** The basic rationale behind **TeTrIs**
 118 is simple. Disease spreads through the contact between infectious and susceptible
 119 members of a population. So by rapidly isolating infectious individuals as soon as
 120 they are detected, as well as everyone they've recently contacted (who may now be
 121 infectious themselves), it may be possible to shut off all the routes of spread, and stop
 122 an outbreak in its tracks. But how accurate does the testing need to be to ensure
 123 that enough cases are traced? And how fast must the system be to halt an outbreak
 124 before it becomes an epidemic?

125 In this section we will explore these questions from the control-theoretic perspec-
 126 tive, with a particular focus on feedback based fundamental limitations. **TeTrIs** is a
 127 feedback process, in which infectious people are isolated in response to measurements
 128 about a population. Therefore, **TeTrIs** is subject to conservation laws and perfor-
 129 mance limitations (see [24, 2] for an introduction). We will discuss the consequences
 130 of these, placing a particular focus on the following inequality:

$$131 \quad (2.1) \quad \|\mathbf{S}\|_\infty \geq 2^{\frac{T_{\text{delay}}}{T_{\text{doubling}}}}.$$




FIG. 1. Trade-off between disturbance amplification and time delay when controlling an unstable system. Typically $\|\mathbf{S}\|_\infty$ less than 1.2–2 is necessary for good performance.

132 The precise meanings of all these terms will be made clear when it is derived in [Sub-](#)
 133 [section 2.2](#), but here \mathbf{S} is the sensitivity function (in the usual control theoretic sense),
 134 T_{doubling} the doubling time of the unstable process¹, and T_{delay} the sum of delays in
 135 the feedback loop. This inequality imposes a fundamental limit on the size of the
 136 sensitivity function, and shows that when very unstable processes (smaller doubling
 137 times) are controlled subject to large delays, the sensitivity function will always be
 138 large. This is illustrated in [Fig. 1](#). Since the sensitivity function determines how
 139 disturbances are amplified and attenuated, [\(2.1\)](#) demonstrates that in such systems,
 140 bad performance is inevitable. Indeed the conventional wisdom is that a value of
 141 $\|\mathbf{S}\|_\infty$ less than 1.2–2 is a prerequisite for acceptable performance (see e.g. [\[3, 8\]](#)).
 142 The size of $\|\mathbf{S}\|_\infty$ is also intimately related to many other measures of performance
 143 and robustness, such as gain and phase margins [\[3, §7.2\]](#).

144 [Equation \(2.1\)](#) gives the implication

$$145 \quad T_{\text{delay}} > T_{\text{doubling}} \log_2 k_{\text{perf}} \implies \|\mathbf{S}\|_\infty > k_{\text{perf}}.$$

146 The consequences of this inequality are quite striking in the context of controlling dis-
 147 ease spread using [TeTrIs](#). For example, it shows that given a disease with a doubling
 148 time of 8 days, if the delays between becoming infectious and being isolated are greater
 149 than 2 days, then $\|\mathbf{S}\|_\infty > 1.2$ (picking the more conservative target might be advis-
 150 able when trying to control a highly uncertain system such as disease spread). This
 151 bound holds even under extremely optimistic assumptions about the implementation
 152 of contact tracing. Specific implementations can certainly be worse!

153 What makes the bound useful is that it provides direct insight into our original
 154 questions. For example, if we set a target of $\|\mathbf{S}\|_\infty \leq 1.2$, the system set up to

¹Here $T_{\text{doubling}} := \frac{\ln 2}{p}$, where $p > 0$ is the location of the unstable pole.


155 conduct contact tracing must be at least four times faster than the doubling time of
 156 the disease:

157
$$\|\mathbf{S}\|_\infty \leq 1.2 \implies 4T_{\text{delay}} \leq T_{\text{doubling}}.$$

158 Slower implementations are guaranteed to fail this objective, and as a result be more
 159 vulnerable to disturbances (e.g. failing to identify an infectious person could result
 160 in a large number of new infections). It is interesting to note that the same rule of
 161 thumb based on more ad-hoc arguments can be found in [4, §III.B-4)]. Inequalities
 162 such as (2.1) provide further evidence for the necessity of a fast TeTrIs system.

163 **2.1. Understanding the Issue.** In this section we will demonstrate the funda-
 164 mental limitation discussed above from the perspective of a simple model of contact
 165 tracing. This will allow us to put these abstract ideas in a more concrete setting, so
 166 as to better understand them. Studying a simple model will also allow us to derive
 167 specialised analysis tools along the way that can provide additional insight. In what
 168 follows we will first outline a simple SIR-based model for contact tracing, before il-
 169 lustrating the fundamental limitations through simulations and additional theoretical
 170 tools.

171 **2.1.1. An SIR-based Model for Disease Control with TeTrIs.** The so
 172 called SIR model is one of the simplest and most widely used models of disease spread
 173 [16]. It is centred around three compartments - $S(t)$, $I(t)$ and $R(t)$ - which specify the
 174 proportion of the population that are susceptible, infectious, and recovered at time t .
 175 So if $S(0) = 1$, then at time $t = 0$ the entire population is susceptible to the disease,
 176 or if $R(1) = 0.5$ then half the population has recovered (or died) at time $t = 1$. The
 177 population shifts between these compartments over time according to two rates, which
 178 model the effect of the infectious population mixing with the susceptible population
 179 and transferring the disease, and the infectious population recovering, respectively.
 180 This can be visualised on a graph with a node for each compartment, and a directed
 181 edge specifying the transition rates between them:



182 Here β is a mixing parameter, specifying the average number of ‘significant’ (those
 183 that could result in the transmission of the disease) interactions that each individual
 184 has per unit time. Each infectious person then has an average of βS such events
 185 with the susceptible population, resulting in βSI new infections per unit time. The
 186 second rate is justified by saying that on average it takes $1/\gamma$ units of time for an
 187 infectious person to recover, which corresponds to members of the I compartment
 188 being transferred to the R compartment with rate γI .
 189

190 When written as a set of differential-algebraic equations, the SIR model is


191 (2.2)
$$\frac{d}{dt} \begin{bmatrix} S \\ I \\ R \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} -1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \beta SI + \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ -1 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix} \gamma I, \quad 1 = S + I + R.$$

192 Of central importance in the study of the SIR model (and disease spread in general)
 193 is the so-called basic reproduction number R_0 . R_0 is defined to be the number of
 194 secondary infections caused by a single primary infection in a population in which
 195 everyone is susceptible to the disease. Consequently if $R_0 > 1$ a small outbreak will
 196 grow, whereas if $R_0 < 1$ it will not. For the SIR model, $R_0 = \beta/\gamma$. This is closely

197 related to notions of stability and doubling times. For the SIR model

$$198 \quad (2.3) \quad T_{\text{doubling}} = \frac{\ln 2}{\beta - \gamma} = \frac{\ln 2 / \beta}{1 - 1/R_0}.$$

199 The SIR model describes the process of disease spread, but not the impact of **TeTrIs**.
 200 To model this, we first split the infectious population into two groups Q and I_{mix} ,
 201 where Q corresponds to the subpopulation that has been quarantined, and I_{mix} the
 202 remainder of the infectious population. We can incorporate the effect of quarantining,
 203 by modifying the rate between the susceptible and infectious population as shown
 204 below. The rationale here is that after taking quarantining into account there should
 205 be $\beta S I_{\text{mix}}$ new infections per unit time, and that $I_{\text{mix}} = I - Q$.



206 The effect of this change is to slightly modify the original SIR equation in (2.2):
 207

$$208 \quad (2.4) \quad \frac{d}{dt} \begin{bmatrix} S \\ I \\ R \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} -1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \beta S (I - Q) + \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ -1 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix} \gamma I, \quad 1 = S + I + R.$$

209 All that remains is to close the loop, and specify how the number of people who are
 210 quarantined at time t depends on the contact tracing. For simplicity, we propose to
 211 model this process through the equation

$$212 \quad (2.5) \quad Q(t) = \alpha e^{-\gamma T_{\text{delay}}} I(t - T_{\text{delay}}),$$

213 where $1 \geq \alpha \geq 0$ and $T_{\text{delay}} \geq 0$. In words this equation says that we are able to
 214 test, trace and isolate a proportion α of those that were infectious T_{delay} days ago².
 215 Together (2.4) and (2.5) constitute a simple model for understanding how **TeTrIs** can
 216 be used to control disease spread.

217 **2.1.2. Analysis of the Simple Model.** Before performing a theoretical analy-
 218 sis of the model, it is instructive to run some simulations. The evolution of the
 219 infectious population after an outbreak affecting 0.01% of the population is shown in
 220 Fig. 2 for a range of different values of the time delay. The simulation parameters for
 221 this figure are:

- 222 • $\alpha = 0.8$, meaning that 80% of cases are tested, traced and isolated.
- 223 • $\gamma = 0.1$, meaning the disease has an average recovery time of 10 days.
- 224 • $\beta = 0.3$, giving the disease a basic reproduction number of 3.

225 The first thing to note is that if the delay is short, the outbreak is contained and
 226 no epidemic ensues. It is also interesting to see the degradation in behaviour as the
 227 delay increases. By the time T_{delay} is 5 days, an epidemic not dissimilar to that
 228 without **TeTrIs** occurs. Even more strikingly though is that by the time T_{delay} is just
 229 2 days, the initial outbreak sees a tenfold increase before it is brought under control.
 230 This relatively short delay has seemingly brought **TeTrIs** to the verge of instability.
 231 When you consider that there may be several simultaneous outbreaks, or capacity
 232 constraints on how many people that can be tested-and-traced, it is clear that short
 233 delays may already be enough to overwhelm a **TeTrIs** system.

²We need to include the proportional constant $e^{-\gamma T_{\text{delay}}}$ since over those T_{delay} days, $(1 - e^{-\gamma T_{\text{delay}}})$ of those that were infectious will have gone on to recover.




FIG. 2. Simulation of (2.4) and (2.5) for a range of values of T_{delay} .

234 A natural first question is, “Are these results in line with the fundamental limita-
 235 tion discussed at the beginning of this section?”. A simple calculation shows that at
 236 the start of the outbreak, the doubling time of the disease equals

237
$$T_{\text{doubling}} = \frac{\ln 2}{\beta - \gamma} \approx 3.5 \text{ days.}$$

238 Therefore, to achieve $\|\mathbf{S}\|_{\infty} \leq 1.2$, it is necessary that $T_{\text{delay}} \leq 0.9$ days. This seems
 239 to be in good agreement with the simulation, where the case with a one day delay
 240 is well controlled, with a rapid decline in performance soon after. In fact, given the
 241 simple nature of the model in (2.4) and (2.5) a more detailed analysis is possible.
 242 The following theorem characterises the stability of the linearisation of the model
 243 about the disease free equilibrium in terms of the system parameters. An intuitive
 244 explanation of this stability criterion is given at the end of the section.

245 **THEOREM 2.1.** *The linearisation of the model in (2.4) and (2.5) is stable³ about*
 246 *the point $(I, R, Q) = (0, 0, 0)$ if and only if*

247 (2.6)
$$T_{\text{delay}} < \frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \left(\frac{\alpha\beta}{\beta - \gamma} \right).$$

248 *Proof.* See Appendix A. □

249 **Remark 2.2.** While any point with $I = 0$ (no infected people) is an equilibrium
 250 of (2.4) and (2.5), we focus on the point $(I, R, Q) = (0, 0, 0)$ for two reasons. Firstly,
 251 this equilibrium corresponds to the initial phase of the pandemic ($S = 1$) and exhibits
 252 the largest unstable growth, thus serving as a natural benchmark for stabilization
 253 purposes. Secondly, it is also the most desirable equilibrium from a public health

³In the sense that $I(t) \rightarrow 0$ in response to a small perturbation about the initial condition $(I(t), R(t), Q(t)) = (0, 0, 0)$ for $t \leq 0$.




FIG. 3. Illustration of the stability boundary in [Theorem 2.1](#). The model of [TeTrIs](#) is stabilising if and only if $(R_0, \gamma T_{\text{delay}})$ lies below the corresponding α curve. For example, if $\alpha = 0.8$ and $R_0 = 3$, the model is stable if and only if $\gamma T_{\text{delay}} < 0.18$

254 perspective and of high practical value. Indeed, many countries have achieved initial
 255 control of the COVID-19 pandemic through [TeTrIs](#) sustaining levels of infections of
 256 several order of magnitude lower than its population. For example, Uruguay, the
 257 home country of several authors of this work, sustained levels of active infections in
 258 at most hundreds for several months, over a population of approximately 3.5 M.

259 In order to interpret the meaning of [Theorem 2.1](#), it helps to rearrange the bound
 260 a little:

$$261 \quad \gamma T_{\text{delay}} < \ln \left(\frac{\alpha \beta}{\beta - \gamma} \right) = \ln \left(\frac{\alpha}{1 - 1/R_0} \right).$$

262 The specific trade-off between parameters and delay implied by the above is shown
 263 in [Fig. 3](#). This figure can be used to quickly assess the amount of delay that can be
 264 tolerated before instability occurs. For example, in the simulations we used a model
 265 with $R_0 = 3$ and $\gamma = 0.1$, with feedback parameter $\alpha = 0.8$. Therefore, from the
 266 figure we see that we require

$$267 \quad T_{\text{delay}} \gamma < 0.18 \quad \implies \quad T_{\text{delay}} < 1.8 \text{ days}$$

268 for the policy to be stabilising. This captures precisely the behaviour we saw in the
 269 simulation, where $T_{\text{delay}} = 2$ seemed to be right on the cusp of instability. We also
 270 see the importance of tracing enough cases. By the time $\alpha < 1 - R_0^{-1} = 2/3$, that is,
 271 we only detect and isolate at most 66% of the cases, the policy isn't even stabilising
 272 with $T_{\text{delay}} = 0$.

273 The stability criterion in [Theorem 2.1](#) also has a nice interpretation through the
 274 [effective reproduction number](#) R_e . Suppose that α in [\(2.5\)](#) is the probability that
 275 an infectious individual is detected and isolated. The amount of time T that each




FIG. 4. Feedback interconnection in (2.7).

276 infectious person is mixing with the susceptible population is then a random variable

$$277 \quad T = \begin{cases} T_r & \text{w.p. } 1 - \alpha \\ \min \{T_{\text{delay}}, T_r\} & \text{w.p. } \alpha. \end{cases}$$

278 In the above $T_r \sim \text{Exp}(\gamma)$ is the time it takes the given person to recover from the
279 disease. Therefore, the expected time that each infectious person is in the mix is given
280 by

$$281 \quad \begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}[T] &= (1 - \alpha) \mathbb{E}[T_r] + \alpha \mathbb{E}[\min \{T_{\text{delay}}, T_r\}] = (1 - \alpha) \frac{1}{\gamma} + \alpha \int_0^{T_{\text{delay}}} \exp(-\gamma s) ds \\ &= \frac{1}{\gamma} (1 - \alpha \exp(-\gamma T_{\text{delay}})). \end{aligned}$$

282 The effective reproduction number is then the expected number of secondary infections
283 generated by an individual:

$$284 \quad R_e = \beta \mathbb{E}[T] = \frac{\beta}{\gamma} (1 - \alpha \exp(-\gamma T_{\text{delay}})) = R_0 (1 - \alpha \exp(-\gamma T_{\text{delay}})).$$

285 The condition that $R_e < 1$, which would correspond to an outbreak dying out, is thus
286 equivalent to

$$287 \quad 1 > R_0 (1 - \alpha \exp(-\gamma T_{\text{delay}})) \iff T_{\text{delay}} < \frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \left(\frac{\alpha}{1 - R_0^{-1}} \right),$$

288 which is precisely the stability condition from [Theorem 2.1](#).

289 **2.2. Fundamental Limitations.** A natural concern with the results from [Sub-](#)
290 [section 2.1.2](#) is that they are seemingly based on a set of highly contentious modelling
291 assumptions. For example, why use the SIR model to capture the effect of disease
292 spread in (2.4), rather than the SEIR model or indeed any of the other more com-
293 plex compartmental variants? What about other models for [TeTrIs](#)? Will the same
294 conclusions hold if we use something more realistic than (2.5)? In this section we will
295 demonstrate that the limitations we observed through [Theorem 2.1](#) and the simula-
296 tions of (2.4) and (2.5) are really a consequence of the interplay between instability
297 and delay.

298 The main result of this section is to derive the inequality (2.1). For simplicity
299 we will stick to the [LTI](#) case, though we will show in [Appendix B](#) that a natural
300 analogue of (2.1) holds in the nonlinear case also. To this end, consider the feedback
301 interconnection of n subsystems described by

$$302 \quad (2.7) \quad \begin{aligned} \hat{e}_i &= \mathbf{G}_i \hat{e}_{i-1} + \hat{d}_i, \quad i \in \{1, \dots, n\} \\ \hat{e}_0 &= -\hat{e}_n. \end{aligned}$$

303 In the above the variables \hat{d}_i and \hat{e}_i denote the Laplace transforms of a set of scalar
 304 disturbances and error signals, and \mathbf{G}_i the transfer function of the i -th subsystem. The
 305 basic setup is illustrated in Fig. 4. This is a general framework for describing feedback
 306 systems, and many models for the control of a disease using TeTrIs can be put in this
 307 framework. For example, after linearisation about the point $(I, R, Q) = (0, 0, 0)$, the
 308 model in (2.4) and (2.5) can be captured by setting $n = 2$, and

$$309 \quad (2.8) \quad \mathbf{G}_1(s) = \frac{\beta}{s - (\beta - \gamma)}, \quad \mathbf{G}_2(s) = \alpha \exp(-sT_{\text{delay}}).$$

310 Variants with, for example, more complicated compartmental models of disease spread
 311 can be similarly handled by substituting in the corresponding transfer function for
 312 \mathbf{G}_1 .

313 The advantage of the abstract formulation in (2.8) is that it allows general prop-
 314 erties of feedback interconnections to be studied for entire classes of models. When
 315 studying the properties of this feedback interconnection, the central objects are the
 316 sensitivity functions. These are the transfer functions from d_i to e_i , which we denote
 317 as \mathbf{S}_i . In the scalar LTI case, the sensitivity functions are all equal to each other and
 318 given by

$$319 \quad (2.9) \quad \mathbf{S}_i = \frac{1}{1 + \mathbf{G}_1 \mathbf{G}_2 \cdots \mathbf{G}_n} =: \mathbf{S}, \quad i \in \{1, \dots, n\}.$$

320 These functions determine how the internal signals \hat{e}_i depend on the external
 321 disturbances \hat{d}_i . Hence the size of \mathbf{S} determines how disturbances are attenuated.
 322 Indeed every single closed-loop transfer function in (2.8) contains \mathbf{S} (for example the
 323 transfer function from \hat{d}_1 to \hat{e}_3 is given by $\mathbf{G}_3 \mathbf{G}_2 \mathbf{S}$). Given its central importance to
 324 the process of feedback, the sensitivity function has been extensively studied both in
 325 theory and in practice. Indeed the requirement that the size of $\|\mathbf{S}\|_\infty$ be less than
 326 1.2–2 is widely used, and is arguably of more importance than criteria based on the
 327 gain margin and phase margin⁴ [3, §7.2].

328 The following theorem shows that when the feedback loop contains a system with
 329 an unstable pole p and a time delay of T_{delay} , $\|\mathbf{S}\|_\infty \geq \exp(pT_{\text{delay}})$. This places
 330 a fundamental limit on the size of the sensitivity function. Surprisingly this result
 331 doesn't seem to be known (for example the lower bound $\|\mathbf{S}\|_\infty \geq \exp(pT_{\text{delay}}) - 1$
 332 is presented in [3, §14.3, Table 14.1]), though the existence of such a bound is certainly
 333 implicit in the work on sensitivity optimisation from the 1980s [17, 13]. We give a
 334 simple proof based on the maximum modulus principle.

335 **THEOREM 2.3.** *If $\mathbf{L} = \frac{\exp(-sT_{\text{delay}})}{s-p} \mathbf{H}$, where $T_{\text{delay}} > 0, p > 0$ and $\mathbf{H} \in \mathcal{R}$, then*

$$336 \quad \left\| \frac{1}{1 + \mathbf{L}} \right\|_\infty \geq \exp(pT_{\text{delay}}).$$

337 *Proof.* Let $a > 1$, and note that the Möbius transform $f(z) = (1 - az)/(a - z)$
 338 maps the closed unit disc into the closed unit disc. This implies that given any transfer

⁴Indeed it can be shown that [3, §7.2]

$$\text{gain margin} \geq \frac{\|\mathbf{S}\|_\infty}{\|\mathbf{S}\|_\infty - 1}, \quad \text{phase margin} \geq 2 \arcsin\left(\frac{1}{2\|\mathbf{S}\|_\infty}\right),$$

whereas no guarantees in the converse direction hold (positive gain and phase margins only guarantee that $\|\mathbf{S}\|_\infty < \infty$).

339 function \mathbf{G} , we have the equivalence

$$340 \quad \|\mathbf{G}\|_\infty \leq 1 \iff \|f(\mathbf{G})\|_\infty \leq 1.$$

341 Therefore, $\|1/(1 + \mathbf{L})\|_\infty \leq a$ if and only if

$$342 \quad \begin{aligned} 1 &\geq \left\| f\left(\frac{1}{a} \frac{1}{1 + \mathbf{L}}\right) \right\|_\infty = \left\| \frac{a\mathbf{L}}{a^2\mathbf{L} + a^2 - 1} \right\|_\infty \\ &= \left\| \frac{a\mathbf{H} \exp(-sT_{\text{delay}})}{a^2\mathbf{H} \exp(-sT_{\text{delay}}) + (s - p)(a^2 - 1)} \right\|_\infty. \end{aligned}$$

343 Now recall that given any transfer function \mathbf{G} , $\|\mathbf{G} \exp(-sT_{\text{delay}})\|_\infty = \|\mathbf{G}\|_\infty$ (delay-
344 ing the input to a transfer function doesn't affect its norm). Therefore,

$$345 \quad \begin{aligned} \left\| \frac{a\mathbf{H} \exp(-sT_{\text{delay}})}{a^2\mathbf{H} \exp(-sT_{\text{delay}}) + (s - p)(a^2 - 1)} \right\|_\infty &= \left\| \frac{a\mathbf{H}}{a^2\mathbf{H} \exp(-sT_{\text{delay}}) + (s - p)(a^2 - 1)} \right\|_\infty \\ &\geq \frac{1}{a \exp(-pT_{\text{delay}})}, \end{aligned}$$

346 where the inequality follows from the maximum modulus principle applied at the
347 point $s = p$ (see e.g. [8, §6.2]). This demonstrates that $\|1/(1 + \mathbf{L})\|_\infty \leq a$ only if
348 $a \geq \exp(pT_{\text{delay}})$ as required. \square

349 It is readily verified that this bound is equivalent to the inequality presented
350 earlier in (2.1) by substituting in the relationship between p and T_{doubling} . That is,
351 setting $p = \ln(2)/T_{\text{doubling}}$ shows that

$$352 \quad \|\mathbf{S}\|_\infty \geq \exp(pT_{\text{delay}}) = 2^{\frac{T_{\text{delay}}}{T_{\text{doubling}}}}.$$

353 **Theorem 2.3** shows that if the transfer function $\mathbf{G}_1\mathbf{G}_2 \cdots \mathbf{G}_n$ (typically referred
354 to as the return ratio) can be written in the form

$$355 \quad (2.10) \quad \mathbf{G}_1\mathbf{G}_2 \cdots \mathbf{G}_n = \frac{\exp(-sT_{\text{delay}})}{s - p} \mathbf{H},$$

356 where \mathbf{H} is any transfer function in \mathcal{R} , then $\|\mathbf{S}\|_\infty \geq \exp(pT_{\text{delay}})$. We therefore
357 see from (2.8) that **Theorem 2.3** applies to our simple model for disease control with
358 **TeTrIs** (set $\mathbf{H} = \alpha\beta$). However, the true power of **Theorem 2.3** is that it holds for
359 any feedback interconnection of the form of (2.7) that satisfies (2.10). This means
360 that the same fundamental limits on performance hold even if we replace our simple
361 model of disease spread from (2.4) with a general compartmental model which predicts
362 an initial period of exponential spread of the disease (if there is no spread, **TeTrIs**
363 is not really necessary anyway). To see this, suppose that the linearisation of our
364 compartmental model of choice can be written in the general form⁵

$$365 \quad (2.11) \quad \frac{dx}{dt} = Ax + BQ, \quad I = Cx.$$

⁵This is the general form of the linearisation of a compartmental model

$$\frac{dx}{dt} = f(x, Q), \quad I = g(x).$$

It may seem restrictive that g doesn't depend on Q . However, if it did, this would mean that the effect of quarantining someone would instantly affect whether or not they are infectious, which is rather implausible.

366 If the model predicts a period of exponential spread of the disease, then the A matrix
 367 will have an eigenvalue $p > 0$. Provided this mode is observable and controllable
 368 (which would also be necessary for there to be any chance of controlling it through
 369 TeTrIs), the transfer function associated with (2.11) will have a pole at p . That is,

$$370 \quad \hat{I} = \frac{1}{s - p} \mathbf{M} \hat{Q}.$$

371 Assuming the same model for TeTrIs we can now write the linearisation of the
 372 feedback interconnection of (2.5) and (2.11) in the framework of (2.7) by setting
 373 $\mathbf{G}_1 = 1/(s - p) \mathbf{M}$, and leaving $\mathbf{G}_2 = \alpha \exp(-sT_{\text{delay}})$. The transfer functions in this
 374 interconnection also satisfies (2.10), so the same fundamental limit holds. In fact it
 375 will continue to hold even if we use more complex models for TeTrIs, provided they
 376 still include a total time delay of T_{delay} . We conclude the section with some final
 377 remarks on Theorem 2.3.

378 *Remark 2.4.* The bound from Theorem 2.3 also applies to the complementary
 379 sensitivity function. That is, under the conditions of Theorem 2.3, $\|\mathbf{L}/(1 + \mathbf{L})\|_{\infty} \geq$
 380 $\exp(pT_{\text{delay}})$.

381 *Remark 2.5.* Theorem 2.3 continues to hold in the nonlinear setting under the
 382 assumption that the feedback interconnection in question has a linearisation. This
 383 essentially follows from the fact that the induced \mathcal{L}_2 -norm of a nonlinear system
 384 (the natural generalisation of the H-infinity norm) is always greater than the induced
 385 \mathcal{L}_2 -norm of its linearisation. This effectively shows that by considering the nonlinear
 386 effects in more realistic models, performance (as measured using sensitivity functions)
 387 can only get worse. This makes it all the more important to aim for performance
 388 requirements on the conservative end (i.e. $\|\mathbf{S}\|_{\infty} \leq 1.2$ rather than $\|\mathbf{S}\|_{\infty} \leq 2$),
 389 necessitating a speedier response. This is discussed in Appendix B.

390 **2.3. Discussion.** The purpose of this section has been to expose fundamental
 391 limits in epidemic control that arise from the combination of two factors: the natural
 392 open-loop instability of the system, and the existence of delays in the feedback loop.
 393 Some of our results were stated in general form, but the main motivating example
 394 is the stabilization and regulation of an epidemic by means of testing, tracing and
 395 isolation of infections. The bounds derived apply to *any* control strategy of this kind,
 396 and can be summarized in “the need for speed”: if the delays involved in identifying,
 397 testing and isolating cases are not very tight, the success of the entire approach is in
 398 jeopardy.

399 There are other strategies for an epidemic control, which are also subject to
 400 fundamental limits of this kind. The most commonly deployed one is *social distancing*
 401 of the entire population. In the context of the classical SIR models, this means making
 402 the parameter β itself a control variable, attempting to stabilize the dynamics at a
 403 nonzero number of infections, compatible with the capacity of the healthcare system.
 404 Of course, a model of social behavior that would cover the control of β is not easy
 405 to obtain, and will not be pursued here. We remark, nonetheless, that for instance a
 406 strategy of ordering a lockdown when infections hit a certain threshold is also subject
 407 to time delays (due to disease latency times) which will compromise performance.


408 Staying within the realm of contact tracing based control, there is another fun-
 409 damental limit that will be analyzed in the following section.

410 **3. Track-and-trace: The Need for Scale.** The analysis of the preceding
 411 section sets the focus on the effect of feedback *delays* in limiting the performance of

412 the **TeTrIs** strategy for epidemic control. Here we will address a different limitation
 413 of the control strategy that manifests in the presence of disturbances. That is, **TeTrIs**
 414 relies on scarce resources: the availability of technology and trained personnel for
 415 taking samples and laboratory testing, for the proactive tracking down of potential
 416 infections, and for ensuring appropriate quarantine.

417 These resources are usually orders of magnitude smaller than the full scale of
 418 the population, and thus often saturate in a widespread epidemic such as COVID-19.
 419 The question we wish to address is the characterization of these limitations in math-
 420 ematical models for the epidemic under **TeTrIs**-based control. To accommodate the
 421 nonlinear effect of saturation in a tractable way, we simplify the delay-to-quarantine
 422 model to finite dimensional dynamics instead of a pure delay. This alternative is
 423 natural in the context of compartmental models: rather than assume that the **TeTrIs**
 424 process takes a fixed amount of time to remove infected people, we assume a rate of
 425 removal is given; this can be seen as the macroscopic aggregate of the random times
 426 involved in the contract tracing process.

427 **3.1. A Model for Contact Tracing.** We thus introduce a compartmental
 428 model that incorporates as a *state* the number of people in quarantine Q , in addition
 429 to the the standard susceptible (S), infected (I) and removed (R) populations. We
 430 assume that people in quarantine effectively isolate and thus are no longer producing
 431 new infections.



432 The **TeTrIs** control strategy is modeled as follows: Infected people are individually
 433 tracked, tested and isolated at a rate μ , meaning that on average, we need a time $1/\mu$
 434 to effectively put these people into quarantine.
 435

436 Under these assumptions, the dynamics become

437 (3.1)
$$\frac{d}{dt} \begin{bmatrix} S \\ I \\ Q \\ R \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} -1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \beta SI + \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ -1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \mu I + \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ -1 \\ 0 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix} \gamma I + \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ -1 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix} \gamma Q.$$

438 This model was already proposed in [22] and its analysis is simple, since quaran-
 439 tined people can be considered as “early recoveries”. More formally, if we consider the
 440 dynamics in $\tilde{S} = S, \tilde{I} = I, \tilde{R} = Q + R$, then the model becomes a simple SIR model
 441 with recovery rate $\gamma + \mu$ and therefore the critical reproduction rate parameter is

442 (3.2)
$$R_\mu := \frac{\beta}{\gamma + \mu}.$$

443 In the model without quarantine, the open-loop critical rates is $R_0 = \beta/\gamma$ (cor-
 444 responding to the case $\mu = 0$). The net effect of contact tracing is to reduce the
 445 reproduction rate: $R_\mu < R_0$. In particular, if the contact tracing rate $\mu \rightarrow 0$ (contact
 446 tracing is extremely slow), it is as if contact tracing is not operating. If contact tracing
 447 is extremely fast ($\mu \rightarrow \infty$), it can stabilize any open-loop transmission rate.

448 In fact, the above analysis gives a first rule of thumb to determine the contact
 449 tracing speed. That is, provided that the open-loop system is unstable ($R_0 > 1$), we
 450 need

451 (3.3)
$$\frac{1}{\mu} < \frac{1}{\beta - \gamma},$$

452 i.e., the average isolation time must be controlled. Eq. (3.3) can be compared with
 453 (2.6), the main difference stems from the fact that here we are continuously isolating
 454 people after a random delay, instead of a fixed one. As an example, if we fix the
 455 average recovery time in $1/\gamma = 10$ days and $R_0 = 3$ ($\beta = 0.3$), the average time to
 456 isolate is bounded by 5 days.

457 While this family of quarantining models is well known, we would like to analyze
 458 the effect of *saturating* the contact tracing capability. To this end, consider that there
 459 is a maximum fraction of the population K that can be tested, tracked, and isolated
 460 simultaneously. This can be due to a limit in the total test processing capability, the
 461 number of contact tracing agents that are deployed or any combination thereof.

462 In such a scenario, if the number of infected people is low, then the quarantining
 463 rate should be μI , since every infected person is being tracked (equivalently there
 464 exists idle tracking and testing capacity). However, if the number of infected people
 465 is high ($I > K$), then the quarantining rate should be μK because of the saturation
 466 of the control capabilities.

467 Under these assumptions, the dynamics become


468 (3.4)
$$\frac{d}{dt} \begin{bmatrix} S \\ I \\ Q \\ R \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} -1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \beta SI + \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ -1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \mu \min\{K, I\} + \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ -1 \\ 0 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix} \gamma I + \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ -1 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix} \gamma Q.$$

469 Note that if $K \geq 1$ in (3.4), we recover the first model.

470 **3.2. Understanding the Issue.** To highlight the issues introduced by this sat-
 471 uration, we first analyze the dynamics (3.4) under the assumption that $S \approx 1$ (i.e.,
 472 at the beginning of the epidemic). In that case, the important part of the dynamics
 473 is the evolution of infected people, which becomes autonomous:

474 (3.5)
$$\frac{d}{dt} I = \beta I - \gamma I - \mu \min\{K, I\}.$$

475 The above differential equation is extremely simple to analyze. However, it yields
 476 an important insight into the effect of saturation in these kinds of dynamics. Consider
 477 the case where $R_0 > 1$, i.e., the system is open-loop unstable, but $R_\mu < 1$, meaning
 478 that the system can be stabilized by an “infinite” contact tracing capability, as in
 479 (3.1). Then the phase diagram becomes



480 The new unstable equilibrium that emerges in the approximate dynamics can be
 481 readily computed by imposing $dI/dt = 0$ in (3.5) to yield

483 (3.6)
$$I^* = \frac{\mu K}{\beta - \gamma}.$$




FIG. 5. Simulation of the system in (3.4) with $I(0) = 2 \times 10^{-3} < I^*$ and $I(0) = 3 \times 10^{-3} > I^*$. Note the different scales in the y-axis.

484 The appearance of this new equilibrium means that the saturation of contact
 485 tracing measures leads to a threshold behavior in the number of infected people,
 486 a phenomenon already observed in several countries that have lost track of disease
 487 spread [15]. Of course, the value I^* is not an equilibrium of the full non-linear dy-
 488 namics (3.4), but it should operate as a threshold value. We revisit this more formally
 489 below.

490 In addition, using that $R_\mu < 1$, we have $\mu > \beta - \gamma$ and thus $I^* > K$. This means
 491 that the stability region is larger than the saturation point of the contact tracing
 492 capability. One way to interpret the threshold is to rearrange (3.6) in the following
 493 manner:

494 (3.7)
$$K = \left(\frac{\beta}{\mu} - \frac{\gamma}{\mu} \right) I^*.$$

495 Here the factor $\frac{\beta}{\mu} - \frac{\gamma}{\mu}$ acts as a reproduction number: it can be interpreted as the
 496 number of “children” a single infected individual generates until it is traced, minus the
 497 ones that recover in that same period. If the total number of new infections generated
 498 by a pool I of infected people is larger than the tracing capacity, then the disease will
 499 spread in the long run.

500 **Example.** To demonstrate the validity of the approximation $S \approx 1$ at the begin-
 501 ning of the epidemic, consider the following scenario: let $\gamma = 1/10$, i.e., recovery time
 502 around 10 days and $R_0 = 3$ ($\beta = 0.3$), so the system is open-loop unstable. Assume
 503 that we need two days on average to test, trace and isolate people, which amounts to
 504 a choice of $\mu = 1/2$. In that case, $I^* = \frac{\mu}{\beta - \gamma} K = 2.5K$, that is, every unit of tracing
 505 capability can deal with up to 2.5 simultaneous infections without crossing the thresh-
 506 old. Let us simulate the system for an initial condition with $S \approx 1$. In particular
 507 we choose $K = 10^{-3}$, meaning that 1 in 1000 people can be tracked simultaneously.
 508 With this choice of K , $I^* = 2.5 \times 10^{-3}$ and we choose $I(0)$ slightly below or above
 509 I^* . Results are shown in Fig. 5. We can see that the simulated (nonlinear) system
 510 indeed enters the exponential phase immediately after reaching the threshold.

511 The above analysis, albeit simplistic, illustrates the effects of local non-linearities
 512 in the stability behavior of epidemics. Namely, a stable region appears around the
 513 extinction equilibrium, but instability can be reinstated if the number of infected
 514 people grows large, overwhelming the control capabilities. We now analyze this further

515 in the complete dynamics (3.4), and then extend the framework to consider the case
 516 where the tracing effort is in part spent on contacts that do not become infected.

517 **3.3. Nonlinear Analysis.** To understand the effect of the saturation without
 518 approximating $S \approx 1$, it is of use to first understand the behavior of $S(t)$. Since, by
 519 (3.4), $\frac{d}{dt}S \leq 0$, $S(t)$ is a *decreasing function of time*. This allows us to derive the
 520 following monotonicity property for $I(t)$.

521 **PROPOSITION 3.1** (Monotonicity of $I(t)$ under (3.4)). *Consider the dynamics*
 522 *(3.4). Then the following property holds:*

$$523 \quad (3.8) \quad \frac{d}{dt}I(t_0) < 0 \implies \frac{d}{dt}I(t) < 0, \quad \forall t \geq t_0.$$

524 *Proof.* Without loss of generality we assume $I(t_0) > 0$. We first consider the
 525 case $I(t_0) \leq K$. In this case, it follows from (3.4) that $S(t_0) < 1/R_\mu$. This is the
 526 standard scenario where the number of susceptible people is not enough to sustain
 527 the epidemic, thus we expect $\frac{d}{dt}I(t) < 0$ for all $t > t_0$.

528 Indeed, if we assume by contradiction that there is a time t_1 such that $\frac{d}{dt}I(t_1) = 0$
 529 then we get

$$530 \quad 0 = \frac{d}{dt}I(t_1) = (\beta S(t_1) - \gamma - \mu)I(t_1) \implies S(t_1) = \frac{1}{R_\mu} > S(t_0),$$

531 which contradicts the fact that $S(t)$ is decreasing in time.

532 The analysis for the case $I(t_0) \geq K$ follows a similar reasoning. Indeed, by
 533 considering the saturated version of (3.4), i.e.,

$$534 \quad (3.9) \quad \frac{d}{dt}I = \beta SI - \gamma I - \mu K,$$

535 we get that $\frac{d}{dt}I(t_0) < 0$ implies

$$536 \quad (3.10) \quad (\beta S(t_0) - \gamma)I(t_0) < \mu K.$$

538 Thus, assuming again by contradiction the existence of t_1 , being the first time $\frac{d}{dt}I(t) =$
 539 0 for $t > t_0$, we obtain

$$540 \quad (3.11) \quad (\beta S(t_0) - \gamma)I(t_0) < \mu K = (\beta S(t_1) - \gamma)I(t_1) \leq (\beta S(t_0) - \gamma)I(t_1),$$

542 where the first inequality follows from $\frac{d}{dt}I(t_0) < 0$ and the second from the mono-
 543 tonicity of $S(t)$. It follows then that $I(t_1) > I(t_0)$, and therefore

$$544 \quad 0 < I(t_1) - I(t_0) = \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \frac{d}{dt}I(t)dt < 0,$$

545 where the last inequality holds by the definition of t_1 . Thus, such a time t_1 cannot
 546 exist. \square

547 The preceding proposition illustrates the critical role of the nullcline $\frac{d}{dt}I = 0$
 548 in (3.4) in understanding the threshold behavior in the nonlinear case. To simplify
 549 exposition and further understand the role of the nullcline, we consider only the most
 550 relevant case when $R_\mu < 1$ and $R_0 > 1$, as before.




FIG. 6. S - I region of the phase plane. Trajectories for uncontrolled evolution (green), unsaturated *TeTrIs* (purple), and *TeTrIs* with $K = 0.01$ (red) are presented for two initial conditions. On the left, $I(0)$ is above the nullcline and the pandemic spreads. On the right, $I^* < I(0) < \tilde{I}(S(0))$ and the pandemic is contained successfully. The $\tilde{I}(S)$ nullcline (solid black) thus acts as a threshold between successful and unsuccessful *TeTrIs*.

551 In this case, the nullcline is fully within the saturated region, and Proposition 3.1
 552 leads to the simple condition

$$553 \quad (3.12) \quad I \leq \tilde{I}(S) := \frac{\mu K}{\beta S - \gamma} = \frac{\mu K}{\beta(S - \frac{1}{R_0})}$$

554 for the disease to dissipate without a major outbreak. Indeed, for the number of
 555 infectious people to increase, $\frac{d}{dt}I(t)$ must be positive, thus violating (3.12).

556 A few remarks are in order. First, the threshold is only valid for the range
 557 $0 \leq \tilde{I}(S) \leq 1$. Outside such range, the disease dies out. In particular, $\tilde{I}(S) \geq 0$ leads
 558 to the already known $S \leq 1/R_0$ condition, and $\tilde{I}(S) \geq 1 \geq I$ guarantees $\frac{d}{dt}I < 0$ for
 559 all I . Second, the nonlinear threshold $\tilde{I}(S)$ is a decreasing function of S (see Fig. 6),
 560 which implies that the most conservative bound is obtained at $S = 1$, which leads to

$$561 \quad \tilde{I}(S) = \frac{\mu K}{\beta S - \gamma} \geq \frac{\mu K}{\beta - \gamma} = I^* > K,$$

562 where the last inequality follows from our assumption $R_\mu < 1$. Thus, the analysis
 563 of the previous section leads to a *lower bound* on the critical threshold, which, as
 564 expected, is quite accurate when $S \approx 1$.

565 **Example.** Consider again the set of parameters $\beta = 0.3$, $\gamma = 1/10$ and $\mu = 1/2$.
 566 As mentioned before, since in this case $R_\mu < 1 < R_0$, $\tilde{I}(S) \geq I^* > K$ holds for all S .
 567 Fig. 6 considers the case of $K = 0.01$ (red) and compares its trajectory on the (S, I)
 568 plane with two additional cases, the unsaturated dynamics (*UnSatTeTrIs*, purple)
 569 and the regular dynamics with no track-and-trace (*No TeTrIs*, red). On the left,
 570 an initial condition $I(0) = 0.65$, $S(0) = 1 - I(0)$, with $I(0)$ above the threshold $\tilde{I}(S)$
 571 (solid black), is considered. On the right, a similar setting but with $I(0) = 0.0255$
 572 between $\tilde{I}(S(0)) = \tilde{I}(0.974) = 0.026$ and $I^* = 0.025$ is considered. This therefore
 573 validates the very slight conservativeness in the I^* threshold.

574 **3.4. Modeling the Tracing of Uninfected Contacts.** One thing the pre-
 575 ceding models do not capture is that the resources of a contact tracing system are
 576 also invariably used to test and trace people that have been in contact with infected

577 individuals, but *have not* developed the infection. As we analyze in this section,
 578 the stability region obtained by TeTrIs control policy will be reduced because of this
 579 phenomenon.

580 Consider the following compartmental model for the epidemic spread. As usual,
 581 I denotes the infected population at a given time. These infected individuals have
 582 multiple contacts which generate secondary infections at rate β , but also have other
 583 contacts, say at rate β_1 , which do *not* generate infection. Since this classification can
 584 only be ascertained by testing, the TeTrIs capability is in part spent on these non-
 585 infected contacts. We will denote the population of *potential infections* by P , and
 586 separate it from the rest of the susceptible population for which we use the variable
 587 S .

588 For our model, we choose $\beta_1 = \nu\beta$. Here ν can be thought as the “odds ratio” that
 589 a contacted individual does not develop the infection. If $\nu = 0$, all potential contacts
 590 are infected and the model operates as before, but typically $\nu > 0$, meaning that
 591 not all contacts are infected. In particular, in Uruguay where we have access to fine
 592 grained data, its value is around $\nu = 10$, meaning that for each infected individual,
 593 10 more people should be tracked.

594 The open-loop model given below carries out the classification of susceptible in-
 595 dividuals into the P and S categories, before incorporating contact tracing:

$$596 \quad (3.13) \quad \frac{d}{dt} \begin{bmatrix} S \\ P \\ I \\ R \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} -1 - \nu \\ \nu \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \beta IS + \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ -1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \beta IP + \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ -1 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix} \gamma I.$$

597 Of course, if we combine both categories of susceptibles into one class $\tilde{S} = S + P$,
 598 the model reduces to a classical SIR model with infection rate β and recovery rate
 599 γ . Thus the reproduction number for the model in (3.13) is given as before by

$$600 \quad R_0 = \frac{\beta}{\gamma}.$$


601 Consider now that the contact tracing effort u is split between u_P and u_I , mean-
 602 ing that the tracking is performed over the whole potentially infected population.
 603 Those that are tracked and are infected are isolated, the others are simply “cleared”
 604 and return to the normal susceptible class. Adding as before a state variable for
 605 quarantined population we obtain the model:

$$606 \quad (3.14) \quad \frac{d}{dt} \begin{bmatrix} S \\ P \\ I \\ Q \\ R \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} -1 - \nu \\ \nu \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \beta IS + \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ -1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \beta IP + \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ -1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} u_P + \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ -1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} u_I + \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ -1 \\ 0 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix} \gamma I + \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ -1 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix} \gamma Q.$$

607 Following the analysis in the previous sections, in the case where there is no limit
 608 to the tracing capabilities, we can assume

$$609 \quad (3.15) \quad u_P = \mu P, \quad u_I = \mu I,$$

610 where $1/\mu$ is the average time to trace and test one individual, either potential or
 611 infected.



612

613 Substituting this control law in (3.14), we can easily observe that, since there
 614 is no coupling between u_P and u_I , the model reduces to the contact tracing and
 615 quarantining model of Section 3.1. Namely, the state $\tilde{S} = S + P, \tilde{I} = I, \tilde{Q} = Q$ and
 616 $\tilde{R} = R$ follows exactly the dynamics in (3.1). In particular, the reproduction rate for
 617 a given value of μ is the same as in (3.2):

618 (3.16)
$$R_\mu = \frac{\beta}{\mu + \gamma}.$$

619 Again with sufficiently fast contact tracing, one can cope with any transmission rate.

620 The interesting case, however, is when contact tracing is limited by the total
 621 number of trackers or simultaneous tests that can be performed. Since these tests are
 622 performed *before* knowing if a person is a potential infection or an infected individual,
 623 the coupling between u_P and u_I becomes

624 (3.17)
$$u_P + u_I \leq \mu K.$$

625 In particular, if we assume that the effort is equally split between all $P + I$
 626 potentially infected individuals, then:

627 (3.18)
$$u_P(P, I) = \mu \frac{P}{P + I} \min\{P + I, K\} = \mu P \min\left\{1, \frac{K}{P + I}\right\},$$

628 (3.19)
$$u_I(P, I) = \mu \frac{I}{P + I} \min\{P + I, K\} = \mu I \min\left\{1, \frac{K}{P + I}\right\}.$$

630 Note that $u_P + u_I = \mu \min\{K, P + I\}$ and thus satisfies (3.17). Also when I and P
 631 are near zero, the feedback law reduces to (3.15).

632 **3.5. Threshold Analysis.** In comparison with (3.4), a full nonlinear analysis
 633 in this case is more involved. Therefore, we resort to the strategy of analyzing the
 634 behavior of the saturated policy around the disease free equilibrium where $S \approx 1$.
 635 In this setting, $P \ll 1$ and $I \ll 1$ so the product term IP can be disregarded.⁶
 636 Substituting this condition and the control law (3.18) in (3.14), the dynamics become
 637 autonomous in P and I with

638 (3.20)
$$\frac{d}{dt} \begin{bmatrix} P \\ I \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & \nu\beta \\ 0 & \beta - \gamma \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} P \\ I \end{bmatrix} - \mu \min\left\{1, \frac{K}{P + I}\right\} \begin{bmatrix} P \\ I \end{bmatrix}.$$

639 We have the following:

⁶This is equivalent to considering that every potential contact only arises from a single infected interaction.

640 PROPOSITION 3.2. Under the condition $R_0 > 1$ (uncontrolled open loop) and
 641 $R_\mu < 1$, the dynamics in (3.20) have a locally asymptotically stable disease free equi-
 642 librium $P = I = 0$, and a further unstable equilibrium emerges at

$$643 \quad (3.21) \quad P^* = \frac{\nu\beta}{((1+\nu)\beta - \gamma)(\beta - \gamma)}\mu K, \quad I^* = \frac{1}{(1+\nu)\beta - \gamma}\mu K.$$

644 *Proof.* We begin by analyzing the disease free case, which is readily verified to be
 645 an equilibrium after substitution in (3.20). The Jacobian matrix in this case retains
 646 a diagonal term $-\mu$ since the saturation is not in effect near the origin. Thus the
 647 Jacobian is

$$648 \quad J_1 = \begin{bmatrix} -\mu & \nu\beta \\ 0 & \beta - \gamma - \mu \end{bmatrix}.$$

649 The Jacobian has two eigenvalues, $-\mu < 0$ and $\beta - \gamma - \mu$ that is also negative because
 650 of the assumption that $R_\mu < 1$, hence the equilibrium is locally stable.

651 To find the second equilibrium, we assume that the saturation is active and im-
 652 poses equilibrium in (3.20):

$$653 \quad \begin{bmatrix} 0 & \nu\beta \\ 0 & \beta - \gamma \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} P^* \\ I^* \end{bmatrix} - \mu \frac{K}{P^* + I^*} \begin{bmatrix} P^* \\ I^* \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}.$$

654 After some algebra one arrives at the expressions in (3.21) for P^* and I^* .

655 Furthermore,

$$656 \quad (3.22) \quad P^* + I^* = \frac{\mu}{\beta - \gamma}K > K,$$

657 under the hypothesis that $\mu > \nu\beta - \gamma \Leftrightarrow R_\mu < 1$. Hence, for any testing rate that
 658 stabilizes under infinite contact tracing assumptions, one gets an unstable equilibrium
 659 when the saturation comes into play. Moreover, note that the total number being
 660 tracked at this new equilibrium coincides with the threshold (3.6).

661 That this equilibrium is indeed unstable can be seen by analyzing its Jacobian
 662 matrix

$$663 \quad J_2 = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & \nu\beta \\ 0 & \beta - \gamma \end{bmatrix},$$

664 which corresponds to the open-loop model that has a positive eigenvalue $\beta - \gamma > 0$
 665 under the assumption $R_0 > 1$. \square

666 As a final remark, note that the equilibrium (3.21) verifies

$$667 \quad (3.23) \quad \frac{P^*}{I^*} = \frac{\nu\beta}{\beta - \gamma} = \frac{R_0}{R_0 - 1}\nu.$$

668 This supports the intuitive observation that, when ν is large, most of the contact
 669 tracing effort is spent only on the potential contacts, reducing the stability margin.
 670 Below we analyze this in a numerical example.

671 **Example.** To depict the behavior of the dynamics (3.20), we choose as before
 672 $\gamma = 1/10$ (10 days average recovery time) and $\beta = 3\gamma$, yielding $R_0 = 3$. The ratio ν
 673 is taken as $\nu = 10$ as observed in some cases, consistent with current measurements




FIG. 7. Phase diagram of (3.20) and unstable equilibrium point of the approximate dynamics. We superimpose the solution of the nonlinear version depicted in Fig. 8.

674 in the real epidemiological scenario in Uruguay, where approximately 10 contacts are
 675 traced per infected individual, generating only one new infection.

676 If we assume that $K = 10^{-3}$, meaning that 1 in 1000 people can be tracked and
 677 tested simultaneously, then the unstable equilibrium occurs at

678
$$P^* + I^* = 2.5 \times 10^{-3},$$

679 but with a lower number of infections, namely,

680
$$P^* = 2.34 \times 10^{-3}, \quad I^* = 0.16 \times 10^{-3}.$$

681 Observe that these parameters are also consistent with the numerical example
 682 in Section 3.1, where the stability threshold was at $I = 2.5 \times 10^{-3}$. Now that the
 683 contact tracing is burdened with potential contacts, and the stability region diminishes
 684 in consequence.

685 The phase plot is depicted in Fig. 7. In particular, starting from an initial con-
 686 dition $I(0) = 0.5 \times 10^{-3}$ (which would be clearly stable in (3.4)) and $P(0) = 0$, the
 687 system enters the exponential phase due to the secondary contacts that burden the
 688 contact tracing capabilities. In particular, in Fig. 8 we can observe that at the peak
 689 70% of the population becomes a potential contact simultaneously, and the susceptible
 690 people go quickly to 0, meaning that the whole population has been in contact with
 691 an infected individual, clearly overwhelming the tracking and testing capabilities.

692 **3.6. Discussion.** To conclude this section, let us recap the main results derived.
 693 The first result is that, whenever there is a cap on the contact tracing capability, a
 694 threshold behavior develops in the dynamics. This emphasizes the *need for scale*,
 695 summarized succinctly in (3.6) and its nonlinear counterpart (3.12). Whenever the
 696 infected number grows, the testing and tracing capacity should grow linearly with the
 697 number of infections in order to avoid saturation. On the other hand, the system can
 698 work in the saturated regime without becoming overwhelmed, but once the threshold
 699 is crossed the epidemic will spread.

700 The second result is that this stability margin is greatly compromised by the fact
 701 that testing and tracing capacity is burdened with the need of following contacts that
 702 do not become infected. This is summarized in (3.22) and (3.23), that evidence how




FIG. 8. Unstable trajectories of the saturated system with limited contact tracing.

703 saturation comes into play due to the total number of contacts, and that this total
 704 number is dominated by potential contacts.

705 **4. Conclusions.** This work presents a cautionary message of the fundamental
 706 limits involved in preventing disease propagation during an epidemic. Our results
 707 highlight the particularly dangerous combination of instability and non-linearity, in-
 708 trinsic of the disease spread process (our plant), together with delays and capacity
 709 constraints, intrinsic of the TeTrIs process (our actuator), that makes the disease
 710 control problem fundamentally challenging. It is important to notice that some of
 711 our quantitative predictions are, to a certain extent, pessimistic, as we only consider
 712 one method for disease spread prevention, i.e., TeTrIs. Clearly, complementing such
 713 a process with other control mechanisms, such as social distancing, using masks, etc.,
 714 can improve the effectiveness and robustness of the disease spread mitigation efforts.
 715 Nevertheless, irrespective of the methods used, we believe that the needs for speed
 716 and scale are, at its core, necessary for effective disease prevention.

717

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773 **Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 2.1.**

774 We begin by linearising the model in (2.4) and (2.5). Eliminating S using the
775 algebraic equation in (2.4) and then linearising about the point $(I, R, Q) = (0, 0, 0)$
776 shows that for small deviations,

777 (A.1)
$$\frac{dI}{dt} = (\beta - \gamma)I - \beta Q.$$

778 Equation (2.5) is already linear. We are therefore required to show that the intercon-
779 nection of (A.1) and (2.5) is stable. Eliminating Q from the I equation in (A.1) with
780 (2.5) gives

781
$$\frac{dI}{dt} + \gamma I + \alpha\beta \exp(-\gamma T_{\text{delay}}) I(t - T_{\text{delay}}) - \beta I = 0.$$

782 Stability is then equivalent to all the roots of the characteristic equation lying in the
783 open left-half-plane. That is,

784
$$s + \gamma + \alpha\beta \exp(-\gamma T_{\text{delay}}) \exp(-s T_{\text{delay}}) - \beta \neq 0, \forall s \in \overline{\mathbb{C}}_+.$$

785 Putting $\tilde{s} = s/\beta$ and rearranging shows that this is equivalent to

786 (A.2)
$$\tilde{s} + R_0^{-1} + \alpha \exp(-\beta T_{\text{delay}} (\tilde{s} + R_0^{-1})) \neq 1, \forall \tilde{s} \in \overline{\mathbb{C}}_+.$$

787 A standard Nyquist argument then shows that this holds if and only if the curve given
788 by

789
$$f(\tilde{s}) := \tilde{s} + R_0^{-1} + \alpha \exp(-\beta T_{\text{delay}} (\tilde{s} + R_0^{-1}))$$

790 when evaluated along the usual Nyquist D -contour does not encircle 1. A simple
791 sufficient condition for this is that

- 792 (i) $f(0) > 1$;
793 (ii) $\frac{d}{d\omega}(\operatorname{Im}(f(j\omega))) > 0$;

794 since together (i)–(ii) ensure that the curve only crosses the real axis to the right of
795 1 (technically we also need to consider the real axis crossing on the return arc along
796 the D -contour, but since for large s , $f(s) \approx s$, these will be to the right of 1). It is
797 readily checked that (i) is equivalent to the condition from the theorem statement.
798 That is,

$$799 \quad (i) \iff T_{\text{delay}} < \frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \left(\frac{\alpha}{1 - R_0^{-1}} \right) =: T^*.$$

800 For (ii), observe that

$$801 \quad \frac{d}{d\omega}(\operatorname{Im}(f(j\omega))) = 1 - \alpha\beta T_{\text{delay}} \exp(-\beta T_{\text{delay}} R_0^{-1}) \cos(\beta T_{\text{delay}} \omega).$$

802 Therefore, it is sufficient that $\alpha\beta T_{\text{delay}} \exp(-\beta T_{\text{delay}} R_0^{-1}) < 1$. We will demonstrate
803 this in two stages. First observe that $\alpha\beta T_{\text{delay}} \exp(-\beta T_{\text{delay}} R_0^{-1}) \leq \alpha R_0 \exp(-1)$.
804 Therefore, if $R_0 < \exp(1)$, (ii) holds (recall that $0 \leq \alpha \leq 1$). Now assume that
805 $R_0 \geq \exp(1)$. We then see that if this is the case,

$$806 \quad \ln \left(\frac{\alpha}{1 - R_0^{-1}} \right) \leq \ln \left(\frac{1}{1 - \exp(-1)} \right) \approx 0.5 < 1,$$

807 so (i) implies that

$$808 \quad \beta T_{\text{delay}} < \beta T^* < R_0.$$

809 Next observe that for $x < R_0$, the function $x \exp(-x/R_0)$ is monotonically increasing
810 in x . Therefore,

$$811 \quad \begin{aligned} \alpha\beta T_{\text{delay}} \exp(-\beta T_{\text{delay}} R_0^{-1}) &< \alpha\beta T^* \exp(-\beta T^* R_0^{-1}) \\ &= R_0 (1 - R_0^{-1}) \ln \left(\frac{\alpha}{1 - R_0^{-1}} \right) \leq 1. \end{aligned}$$

812 Therefore, (i) \implies (ii), and by consequence the conditions of the theorem are sufficient
813 for stability. Necessity follows since if $T_{\text{delay}} \geq T^*$, then $f(0) \leq 1$. Since for $x \gg 0$,
814 $f(x) > 1$, by the intermediate value theorem there must be some $x \geq 0$ for which
815 $f(x) = 1$. Therefore, [Equation \(A.2\)](#) does not hold, and the system will be unstable.

816 **Appendix B. Extending [Theorem 2.3](#) to the Nonlinear Setting.**

817 In this section we will demonstrate that under appropriate assumptions, a natural
818 analogue of [Theorem 2.3](#) holds in the nonlinear setting. To do this we will prove that
819 the induced \mathcal{L}_2 -norm of a system is always lower-bounded by the induced \mathcal{L}_2 -norm
820 of its linearisation. Since the induced \mathcal{L}_2 -norm of an [LTI](#) system is equal to its H-
821 infinity norm, this shows that if the linearisation of a nonlinear system is [LTI](#), then
822 the induced \mathcal{L}_2 -norm of the sensitivity function of the nonlinear system must satisfy
823 the same bound from [Theorem 2.3](#).

824 The result we are trying to prove is in fact rather elementary. However, it requires
825 a bit of setup to lay out the appropriate definitions and concepts. The difficulties stem
826 from the fact that we would like to combine nonlinear state-space models (to describe
827 general compartmental models for disease spread) and delays. Accordingly we adopt

828 the standard operator theoretic setup on \mathcal{L}_2 which covers both these types of model.
 829 More specifically, \mathcal{L}_2 is the space of functions $f : [0, \infty) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ with finite norm

$$830 \quad \|f\| := \sqrt{\int_0^\infty |f(t)|^2 dt}.$$

831 This is a subspace of \mathcal{L}_{2e} , whose members need only be square integrable on finite
 832 intervals. An operator is a function $\mathcal{G} : \mathcal{L}_{2e} \rightarrow \mathcal{L}_{2e}$, and the induced \mathcal{L}_2 -norm of an
 833 operator is defined as

$$834 \quad \|\mathcal{G}\|_{\mathcal{L}_2} := \sup \left\{ \frac{\|\mathcal{G}(u)\|}{\|u\|} : u \in \mathcal{L}_{2e}, u \neq 0 \right\}.$$

835 In the case where the operator \mathcal{G} is describing the dynamics of a **LTI** system with
 836 transfer function \mathbf{G} , $\|\mathcal{G}\|_{\mathcal{L}_2} = \|\mathbf{G}\|_\infty$.

837 The natural generalisation of a linearisation in this setting is given by the Fréchet
 838 derivative. An operator \mathcal{G} is Fréchet differentiable at a point $x \in \mathcal{L}_2$ if there exists a
 839 linear operator \mathcal{A} such that

$$840 \quad \lim_{h \rightarrow 0} \frac{\|\mathcal{G}(x+h) - \mathcal{G}(x) - \mathcal{A}(h)\|}{\|h\|} = 0.$$

841 If such a linear operator exists, it is unique, and we denote the Fréchet derivative of
 842 \mathcal{G} at x as $D\mathcal{G}(x) = \mathcal{A}$.

843 With these definitions in place, we are ready to state the main result of this sec-
 844 tion. The following lemma shows that provided the linearisation exists, the induced
 845 \mathcal{L}_2 -norm of the linearisation of an operator about a fixed point (an equilibrium point)
 846 is always smaller than the \mathcal{L}_2 -norm of the operator itself. This means that if we have
 847 a nonlinear system \mathcal{G} with linearisation described by an **LTI** system with transfer
 848 function \mathbf{G} , then $\|\mathcal{G}\|_{\mathcal{L}_2} \geq \|\mathbf{G}\|_\infty$. This immediately gives us a nonlinear gener-
 849 alisation of **Theorem 2.3**. In particular, if we instead study the nonlinear feedback
 850 interconnection

$$851 \quad \begin{aligned} \text{(B.1)} \quad e_i &= \mathcal{G}_i(e_{i-1}) + d_i, \quad i \in \{1, \dots, n\} \\ e_0 &= -e_n, \end{aligned}$$

852 and define the sensitivity functions to be the operators $\mathcal{S}_i : d_i \rightarrow e_i$, then provided
 853 the linearisations of \mathcal{S}_i are **LTI**, $\|\mathcal{S}_i\|_{\mathcal{L}_2}$ must satisfy exactly the same lower bound
 854 from **Theorem 2.3**.

855 **LEMMA B.1.** *Given an operator \mathcal{G} , if $\mathcal{G}(0) = 0$ and \mathcal{G} is Fréchet differentiable at*
 856 *0, then*

$$857 \quad \|\mathcal{G}\|_{\mathcal{L}_2} \geq \|D\mathcal{G}(0)\|_{\mathcal{L}_2}.$$

858 *Proof.* Let $\mathcal{A} = D\mathcal{G}(0)$. Using the reverse triangle inequality shows that for any
 859 non-zero $x \in \mathcal{L}_{2e}$ and non-zero $\epsilon \in \mathbb{R}$,

$$860 \quad \begin{aligned} \|\mathcal{G}\|_{\mathcal{L}_2} &\geq \|\mathcal{G}(\epsilon x)\| / \|\epsilon x\| = \|\mathcal{G}(\epsilon x) - \mathcal{A}(\epsilon x) + \mathcal{A}(\epsilon x)\| / \|\epsilon x\| \\ &\geq \|\mathcal{A}(x)\| / \|x\| - \|\mathcal{G}(\epsilon x) - \mathcal{A}(\epsilon x)\| / \|\epsilon x\|. \end{aligned}$$

861 Taking the limit $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$, we see from the definition of the Fréchet derivative that this
 862 implies $\|\mathcal{G}\|_{\mathcal{L}_2} \geq \|\mathcal{A}(x)\| / \|x\|$. Taking the sup over $x \in \mathcal{L}_{2e}$ gives the result. \square